Abstract. We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the unit simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the k-th largest player under the uniform distribution. We analyze the average voting power of the k-th largest player and its dependence on the quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for small values of n and a general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the average Banzhaf power index and the quota for the uniform measure on the simplex.
Introduction
An n-player weighted voting game G can be described by a weight vector w := (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ ∆ n , where ∆ n is the standard (n − 1)-dimensional unit simplex, and a qualified majority quota q ∈ ( 1 2 , 1]. In such game, the set of winning coalitions W ⊂ P(V ), where V is the set of voters, is defined as follows:
The notion of voting power, i.e., a voter's influence on the outcome of the game, which, as demonstrated by Penrose [1] , is not necessarily proportional to such voter's weight, is of fundamental importance to the study of voting systems. The two most popular voting power indices have been introduced by Shapley and Shubik in 1954 [2] and by Banzhaf in 1964 [3] . Both define the voting power of a voter v in terms of the probability that their vote is decisive, but differ in their definition of the probability measure on voting outcomes: the Shapley-Shubik index treats each permutation of voters as equiprobable, while the Penrose-Banzhaf index assigns equal probability to each combination. In addition, there are two versions of the Banzhaf index in common use: one is defined as the probability of a voter v casting a decisive vote and is known as the non-normalized or absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index, ψ v [4] , while the other one, β v , is further normalized in order to ensure that the vector (β 1 , . . . , β n ) lies on the unit simplex ∆ n . The vector of Shapley-Shubik indices always lies on ∆ n , hence there is no need for further normalization.
It is well known that each player's voting power depends not only on the weight vector, but also on the quota [5, 6, 7] . However, as demonstrated in [8] , the dependence of the Penrose-Banzhaf index on both parameters is usually discontinuous and highly erratic, wherefore any results obtained from investigating it for a fixed weight vector are apt to be influenced by number-theoretic pecularities of that vector and therefore unsuitable for drawing more general conclusions. We seek to avoid that problem by analyzing the dependence of the Penrose-Banzhaf index on the quota q for a random weighted voting game, where the ordered power index vectors are averaged over the whole simplex ∆ n with some specified probability measure P . For the simplest case of the uniform measure, we obtain exact closed-form formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of voting weight of the k-th largest player, a general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the expected values of the absolute and normalized Penrose-Banzhaf indices of the k-th largest player and the quota, and an approximate analytical formula for the former. All of those results constitute an original contribution of the paper. We further outline several applications of those results in the field of mathematical voting theory and in some other areas.
Related work
The relationship between quota and the Penrose-Banzhaf power index for a fixed weight vector has been investigated in [9] and more generally in [8] , with the latter reporting several results on, inter alia, the upper and lower bounds of the ratio and difference between a player's weight and normalized Banzhaf index. Analytical results about the values of the Penrose-Banzhaf index depending on quota are available primarily for the extreme quotas: the Penrose limit theorem [1, 10] , proven under certain technical assumptions in [11] , provides that for q = 1/2, ψ i (q)/ψ j (q) converges to w i /w j for each i, j ∈ V as n → ∞. As established in Refs. [12, 13] , however, this theorem does not necessarily hold for other values of q. On the other hand, it is easy to notice that as q → 1, ψ i (q) converges to 2 1−n and β i (q) converges to 1/n regardless of w. In [14, 15, 16] it has been established that q
is a good approximation of the quota minimizing the distance w − β 2 (hence β v (q * ) ≈ w v ). Therefore, if w is uniformly distributed on ∆ n , E(q
. In [17] upper bounds have been provided for the deviation between weights and Penrose-Banzhaf indices. Variable quotas have been considered in [4] , where it has been proven that ψ v (q) averaged over a uniform distribution on ( 1 2 , 1] equals w v for any w ∈ ∆ n (Theorem 6 and Corollary 3). The case of variable (but deterministic) weights has been investigated in [18] . The relationship between the number of dummy players (i.e., such players that β v (q) = 0) and the quota has been studied in [19] .
The case of random weights, which is of chief interest to us, has been analyzed only for the Shapley-Shubik index. In Ref. [20] , the issue of selecting quotas maximizing or minimizing the Shapley-Shubik power of a given player is analyzed, noting that testing whether a given quota does so is an NP-hard problem. The authors also note that for a large range of quotas close to 1/2, the Shapley-Shubik power of a small player tends to be stable and close to his or her weight. In Ref. [21] , it is established that if w is uniformly distributed on the unit simplex, the expected ratio of the Shapley-Shubik index S v to weight approaches 1 as n → ∞. Ref. [22] identifies certain number-theoretic artifacts in the relationship between S v and q when weights are drawn from a multinomial distribution and normalized, and provides a lower bound for the expected S v of the smallest player. A problem similar to ours is posed in [23] , where a closedform characterization of the Shapley values of the largest and smallest players for w drawn from a uniform distribution on ∆ n or obtained by normalizing n independent random variables drawn from a uniform distribution is provided. Finally, in [24] a closed-form formula is given for the Shapley-Shubik power index in games with super-increasing weights.
Numerous works analyze weighted voting games in a variety of empirical settings, including the Council of the European Union [7, 9, 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] , the U.S. Electoral College [32, 33] , the International Monetary Fund [34, 35] , the U.N. Security Council [36] and joint stock companies [37] . The above list of references is by no means complete, but demonstrates that the relevance of the subject goes far beyond purely academic.
Random weighted voting games
By random weighted voting game we understand a weighted voting game in which the number of players n and the quota q are fixed, and the weight vector w is drawn from the unit simplex ∆ n with some probability measure P . Among possible P -s, we distinguish the class of Dirichlet measures: Definition 1. A Dirichlet measure Dir(α), where α := (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ R n + , is a continuous probability measure that has a probability density h with respect to the Lebesgue measure on ∆ n :
where the normalization constant B (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is the multivariate beta function: , 3, 16 9 ) (right).
Remark 1. Note that the uniform (Lebesgue) measure on ∆ n is a special case of the Dirichlet measure with α 1 = · · · = α n = 1.
For proof, see [39] .
We have multiple reasons for distinguishing the Dirichlet measure. It has several desirable theoretical properties [40, Sec. 3.4] , such as neutrality: Definition 3. Let X := (X 1 , . . . , X n ) be a random vector in R n + , and let Y be an image of X under a mapping generated by permutating coordinates. A vector
Proposition 2. Neutrality of all permutations of X ∈ ∆ n characterizes the Dirichlet measure on ∆ n [42] .
Moreover, the Dirichlet measure is frequently used in computational social choice, as it arises in the limit of the family of Pólya urn models [43, 44, 45] , commonly used to model the distribution of voter preference profiles [46, 47, 48, 49] . Note that in many instances of weighted voting games, weights are a function of the preference profile of the electorate (e.g., in parliaments and other representative assemblies). The Dirichlet distribution is also commonly used in statistics, being the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution. Through an analogy with the principle of insufficient reason, we further focus on symmetric Dirichlet measures among the class of all Dirichlet measures (as we have no reason to distinguish any player a priori ), and among those on the Lebesgue measure (which is equivalent to the familar Impartial Anonymous Model used in computational social choice theory [50, 51] ).
Voting Weight of the k-th Largest Player

Introduction
While our probability measure on ∆ n is symmetric, we nevertheless are interested in distinguishing players in the random weighted voting game, only a posteriori rather than a priori (otherwise the problem would be too trivial to merit serious interest). Note that almost surely the coordinates of w, i.e., the voting weights of the players, can be strictly ordered. That ordering provides a natural basis for distinguishing the players. We start with the simplest question: what is the expectation and density of the distribution of voting weight of the k-th largest player in a random weighted voting game? Let W be a random variable drawn from ∆ n with the probability measure P . While coordinates W 1 , . . . , W n can be thought of as a sample of random variables, and W ↓ k as the k-th largest order statistic of that sample, virtually all results in that field assume that order statistics are computed for a sample of independent variables, which is manifestly not the case for the barycentric coordinates of a vector drawn from a simplex. For that reason, the problem can be considered non-trivial.
Expectations: barycenter of the asymmetric simplex
Each ordering of the components of a probability vector w, w
corresponds to dividing the entire simplex ∆ n into n! asymmetric parts∆ n and selecting one of them. If W is drawn with a uniform distribution, the random vector
is uniformly distributed on the asymmetric simplex∆ n with vertices (1, 0, . . . , 0), 1, 0, . . . , 0) ,. . . , 1 n (1, 1, . . . , 1) . In the case n = 3, the simplex ∆ 3 is equivalent to the equilateral triangle, while∆ 3 corresponds to its sixth part.
The expectation of an ordered probability vector W ↓ coincides with the barycenter b of the asymmetric simplex∆ n . The k-th coordinate of that barycenter, b k , for k = 1, . . . , n, can be expressed by the sum of harmonic numbers H n := n j=1 1/j, as follows:
Thus we obtain an explicit expression (valid for an arbitrary dimension n) for the expected voting weight of the k-th largest player:
For instance, in the case of n = 3 the average ordered random probability vector is E(W ↓ ) = (11, 5, 2)/18, while in the case n = 6 one obtains E(W ↓ ) = (147, 87, 57, 37, 22, 10)/360. Note that for a large n the harmonic numbers scale as ln n + γ, where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, so that the first coordinate E(W ↓ 1 ) scales as ln n/n, the median coordinate as ln 2/n, and the smallest coordinate as 1/n 2 .
Densities
More generally, we have obtained the following theorem: Proof. Only a sketch of the proof will be given here. We start with Proposition 1, noting that if X 1 , . . . , X n ∼ Exp (1) are independent random vari- (1) are independent pairwise and of X 1 , . . . , X n , which we use to obtain a characteristic function of X ↓ k . Then through contour integration and residue theorem we obtain the density of X
k is easy to obtain when we note that it is simply a characteristic function of a sum of n − k random variables distributed according to Exp (1) truncated from above at X ↓ k , and of k − 1 random variables distributed according to Exp (1) truncated from below at X ↓ k . We then use a well-known formula from [53, Eq. (6) ] to obtain the joint characteristic function of X ↓ k and Ψ , ϕ X ↓ k ,Ψ , and we obtain the density of the ratio X ↓ k /Ψ through a result by [54] :
By computing this integral, we now obtain Eq. (7).
Remark 2. Elementary techniques of real analysis are sufficient to demonstrate that f n,k is smooth of class C n−3 for n > 2. 3 Voting Power of the k-th Largest Player
Definitions
The notion of a power index serves to characterize the a priori voting power of a player in a weighted voting game by measuring the probability that his vote will be decisive in a hypothetical ballot: the winning coalition would fail to satisfy the qualified majority condition if this player were to change his vote. In the classical approach by Penrose [1, 10] and Banzhaf [3] it is assumed that all potential coalitions of voters are equally likely. To compute the resulting Penrose-Banzhaf index one has to enumerate all possible coalitions, and for each player find the number of cases in which his vote is decisive. Let ω < 2 n be the total number of all winning coalitions (i.e. such coalitions that satisfy the necessary condition of qualified majority) and ω i the number of winning coalitions that include the i-th player.
Definition 5. The absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index ψ k of the i-th voter, where i = 1, . . . , n, is defined in the following way:
To compare these indices for decision bodies consisting of different number of players, it is convenient to define the normalized Banzhaf index : Definition 6. The normalized Banzhaf index index β k of the i-th voter, where i = 1, . . . , n, is
The main feature of the absolute index is a clear probabilistic interpretation, while the main feature of the normalized index consists of the fact that vector β always lies in the probability simplex ∆ n .
Computation of power indices
Power indices are known to be difficult to compute. It has been established in [56] , and more generally in [57] , that the problem of computing either of the two standard power indices is NP-complete in a generic case. Exact solutions include a direct enumeration of all winning coalitions (which runs in exponential time), a partitioning algorithm of [58] (likewise exponential), and the method of generating functions [59, 60, 61, 62] , which runs in polynomial time, but requires weights to be rational. Among approximation methods, the normal approximation, developed in [63] and drawing on the method of multilinear extensions [64, 65, 66] , will be of particular interest to us. Other approximations include those based on Monte Carlo techniques [67, 68, 69] , and hybrid methods proposed in [70, 71, 72] .
Analytical results for very small values of n
Let D n be the set of all n-player weighted voting game (up to isomorphism). For small values of n, such games can be easily enumerated -see [73, 74, 75] and more generally [76, 77, 78] . Their number increases rapidly with n: in a symmetric case, there are 2 distinct games for the case of 2 players, 5 games for 3 players, 14 for 4 players, 62 for 5 players, 566 for 6 players, and 11971 for the case of 7 players.
For each p ∈ D n there exists a set of polytopes Θ p of dimension n − 1 such that for any two points within θ p := Θ p the power index vectors (β . Note that the volume of θ p depends on the choice of the quota q. Now let P be a probability measure on the unit simplex from which the weight vectors are drawn. The expected voting power of the k-th largest player equals:
We can use Eq. (12) to obtain a formula for the expected power index of the kth largest player as functions of the quota q. The case of n = 2 is straightforward, as there are only two distinct games with β 
Let us now consider the simplest non-trivial case -that of n = 3. There are five possible games to consider:
By F k in the above table we denote the cumulative distribution function of the k-th largest player's weight, k = 1, 2, 3. From the above and Eq. (7), we obtain the following probabilities: 
Numerical results for small values of n
As mentioned in Sec. 1, if a player's voting weight is fixed, the dependence of the power index on the quota q ∈ [ 1 2 , 1) is highly erratic. The problem is illustrated by Fig. 4 , plotting the dependence of the normalized Banzhaf index β on q in a six-player game with voting weights fixed at the coefficients b 6 = (147, 87, 57, 37, 22, 10)/360 of the barycenter of the asymmetric simplex ∆ 6 , which describes an ordered vector w ↓ averaged over ∆ 6 with respect to the uniform measure.
For the standard majority, q = 50%, the voting power β 1 of the largest player A is much larger than his voting weight, b 1 = 147/360 ≈ 40.8%. This is at the expense of the second largest player B, whose voting power is much smaller than his voting weight b 2 = 87/360 ≈ 24.2% and is equal to the voting power of the third owner, β 2 = β 3 . For larger quota q, the voting power of B increases, so that β 2 becomes equal to β 1 , as his votes become indispensable to form a winning coalition. The dependence of the Banzhaf index β i on the quota q is non-monotonic also for other players.
Let us now consider a random voting game with the uniform measure on ∆ n . Let β . Absolute and normalized Penrose-Banzhaf power indices, ψ and β, of six players averaged over the probability simplex with respect to the uniform measure as a function of the quota q. Horizontal lines represent the average voting weight of each player, and the vertical one represents the optimal quota q * for which the distance w − β 2 is minimized.
In the case of the standard majority, q = 1/2, the average voting power of the largest player, β ↓ 1 (1/2) ≈ 54%, is much larger than his average weight w ↓ 1 ≈ 40.8%, at the expense of all other players. At this quota, the second player loses (on average) the most, but his average voting power β ↓ 2 grows with q. This occurs up to q 2 ≈ 77%, at the expense of the third player, whose mean voting power initially decreases with q and then grows rapidly for q ∈ (q 2 , q 3 ), with q 3 ≈ 88%. For even larger values of the quota q, the voting power of the remaining smaller players also increases, and for the maximal quota, q = 100%, the voting powers of all players become equal, β ↓ k = 1/6 for k = 1, . . . , 6. Note that the average Banzhaf indices of the two smallest players fluctuate mildly with q around the horizontal lines representing the components b 5 and b 6 of the barycenter b 6 of the asymmetric simplex∆ 6 . For these players their average voting power is practically proportional to their voting weights.
The same pattern appears for an arbitrary number of players: the average voting power of the largest player is initially considerably larger than his voting weight and decreases monotonously with the quota -see Fig. 6 . The average power of the second player has a single maximum at q 2 , which depends on n. For subsequent players average Banzhaf indexes fluctuate with the quota, but the amplitudes of the fluctuations diminish as k increases. 
Normal approximation for large values of n
For larger values of n, numerical simulations are no longer feasible. However, it becomes possible to use another technique, namely the normal approximation, to obtain not only numerical results, but analytic (if approximate) formula for the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index of the k-th largest power. The normal approximation of the non-normalized Banzhaf index is based on the fact that as n → ∞, the distribution of coalition weights converges to the normal distribution with parameters µ := As a player's vote is decisive if and only if the total weight of a coalition w C satisfies q − w v ≤ w C < q, we can express the probability of a player being pivotal in terms of a difference of two normal CDFs Φ:
Now let f k,n be the density of the distribution of the voting weight of the kth largest player given by Eq. (7), and let g k,n be the conditional density of the distribution of the sum of squares of voting weights of all players given the voting weight of the k-th largest player (for very large values of n, the latter can be approximated by the unconditional density of the distribution of the sum of squares of voting weights of all players). Then the expected voting power of the k-th largest player is given by:
y − x 2 dy dx.
(16) As noted by [15] , for q close to the inflection point of the normal cumulative distribution function, this can be further approximated by
Remark 4. Normal approximation is only valid for the absolute Penrose-Banzhaf index. Nevertheless, it might be possible to approximate the expected normalization value using the Coleman efficiency coefficient Q, i.e., the probability that a randomly chosen coalition is a winning one [79] . In investigating that possibility we have established that in a weighted voting game with q ≥ 1/2, the Coleman efficiency coefficient is bounded from the above:
A proof follows from the Hoeffding's inequality [80] .
Splines
The following theorem describes the functional form of the relation between the expected Penrose-Banzhaf indices of the k-th largest player and the quota:
Theorem 2. If the weight vector w := (w 1 , . . . , w n ) ∈ ∆ n is uniformly distributed, the absolute and normalized Banzhaf power indices of the k-th largest voter, ψ ↓ k (q) and β ↓ k (q), are splines of degree n − 1 for each k = 1, ..., n and q ∈ ( Proof (Outline). Note that for each k = 1, ..., n and any fixed q, β ↓ k (q) is a linear combination of the volumes of one or more subsets of ∆ n , and the boundaries of each of those subsets vary linearly (or piecewise linearly) with q. Under the flat measure on the simplex, the volume of each subset of interest is equal to its Lebesgue measure, which is a polynomial of degree n − 1. Accordingly, β ↓ k is a spline of degree n − 1. The proof for ψ ↓ k proceeds analogously. Also, numerical results presented above suggest a following conjecture: Conjecture 1. For the uniform distribution on the unit simplex, the normalized Banzhaf power index of the k-th voter β ↓ k (q) has exactly k − 1 extremes over (1/2, 1) for every k = 1, ..., n.
Remark 5. Note that for n = 3, Conjecture 1 follows immediately from the analytic form of E[β ↓ (q)] given by Eq. (14) . For k = 2 we have a maximum at 34/39 (≈ 87.18%), and for k = 3 we have a minimum at 5/9 (≈ 55.56%) and a maximum at 13/18 (≈ 72.22%).
Potential Applications and Future Work
The results presented above enhance our understanding of the relationship between the quota and the voting power in a random voting game by minimizing the noise resulting from number-theoretic pecularities. They can have potential applications in the area of voting rule design, especially if the rules are drafted behind a veil of ignorance with regard to the actual distribution of players' weights (as is the case for business corporations). Moreover, the results presented in Sec. 2, regarding the expectation and distribution of voting weights of the k-th largest player, may find applications in other areas of computational social choice and mathematical voting theory. For instance, Theorem 1 can be easily applied to obtain the probability of a candidate with a specified vote share winning the election held under the plurality rule.
Future work will focus on proving Conjecture 1; improving the large-n approximation and extending it for the normalized Banzhaf index; and generalizing the results for other Dirichlet measures.
